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EXPLAINING THE RISE OF THE LEFT IN LATIN AMERICA  
Luisa Blanco and Robin Grier 
Abstract 
English: Latin American politics has taken a left-hand turn in the last decade, with an increasing 
number of chief executives hailing from left-of-center parties.  We investigate the political and 
socio-economic factors explaining political ideology of the chief executive in a sample of 100 
elections taking place between 1975 and 2007 in eighteen Latin American countries.  We find 
that the commodity booms in agricultural, mining and oil are positively and significantly related 
to the probability that a country will have a chief executive from a left-of-center political party. 
However, for oil exports, we observe that this effect only holds for Venezuela. We also show that 
past political discrimination and government crises are positively and significantly associated 
with a move to more left-wing chief executives.  Openness to trade and having a president from 
the right in the previous presidential term negatively affects the probability of having a more 
liberal president, although the effect of trade openness disappears when the incumbent president 
was a conservative.  We also find that when a government crisis occurs during a term with a 
president from the right, the probability of having a president from the left in the next term 
increases significantly. 
Spanish: La política en Latinoamérica ha tomado un giro a la izquierda en la última década, 
donde el número de presidentes de la izquierda y centro-izquierda ha incrementado. Este 
artículo analiza los factores socio-económicos y políticos que explican los cambios en la 
ideología política de los presidentes elegidos con una muestra de 100 elecciones desde 1975 al 
2007 en dieciocho países Latinoamericanos. En este estudio encontramos que la bonanza en el 
mercado de la materia prima, en específico la agricultura, la minería y el petróleo, tiene una 
relación positiva con la probabilidad de que un país elija un gobierno de izquierda. Sin 
embargo, encontramos que en el caso del  petróleo, la relación positiva solo existe en Venezuela. 
También encontramos que la discriminación política y las crisis de gobierno están positivamente 
relacionadas con un movimiento hacia la izquierda en el poder ejecutivo. La apertura al 
comercio internacional y haber tenido un presidente de derecha en el término previo a la 
elección afecta negativamente la probabilidad de que un gobierno de izquierda sea elegido, pero 
el efecto de la apertura al comercio internacional desaparece cuando hay un gobierno de 
derecha en el periodo anterior. También encontramos que cuando hay una crisis de gobierno y  
un presidente de derecha está en el poder, la probabilidad de que gane un presidente de 
izquierda en las próximas elecciones incrementa.      
JEL Categories: D72, P48, P52 
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INTRODUCTION 
The left is currently resurgent in much of Latin America, a phenomenon that started over 
a decade ago and continues to be strong today.  In the early 1990s, 64 percent of Latin American 
presidents were from a right-wing party.  In 2005-2008, this number had fallen to 33 percent.  In 
fact, by the beginning of 2009, fifteen out twenty-one Latin American countries had a president 
from a left or center-left party.1  Even though grouping all left-wing politicians in the same 
category obscures some important differences among them, it is clear that the popularity of the 
left in general has grown immensely in the region.  
What is less clear is the reason behind this phenomenon. Some have attributed this "left 
turn" to the inability of previous governments to meet social, economic, and political 
expectations, while others argue that left-wing parties have moderated to such an extent that 
people no longer fear voting for them.  In this paper, we investigate the socio-economic and 
political reasons behind the political ideology of the president in eighteen Latin American 
countries from 1975 to 2007.2  We find three main results.  First, natural resource abundance has 
played a significant role in the rise of the left.  Agricultural, mineral, and oil exports are all 
negative and significant in a regression on executive ideology, meaning that a country that 
experienced an increase on resource exports in one of these sectors was also more likely to elect 
a president from a left-of-center party.  Interestingly, a jackknife exercise reveals that the impact 
of oil exports on political ideology is driven by Venezuela. Second, past political discrimination 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  The numbers here are based on data from Beck et al.’s (2001) Dataset on Political Institutions. The countries 
considered are Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, Uruguay, 
and Venezuela.    
2	  Our unit of analysis is an electoral term, where our dependent variable is the political ideology of the elected 
president. The independent variables are lagged values in most cases, calculated as the average in the previous 
presidential term. We provide more discussion of this in the methodology and data section.   
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and government crises are important factors in determining the ideology of chief executives.3  
The countries in our sample which historically have had more political discrimination and more 
government crises are also more likely to have left-wing presidents.  Lastly, countries which 
were more open to trade in the previous presidential term are less likely to elect left-wing 
presidents, although this relationship disappears when the previous president was from a 
conservative party.   
We begin by reviewing the literature on the rise of the left in Latin America and 
discussing how our paper builds on this work.  The next section presents our methodology and 
data. We go on to discuss the results from our main specification as well as from several 
robustness tests and present the quantitative effects of the right-hand side variables. The last 
section concludes. 
   
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature on the Latin American left has identified many different reasons for its 
popularity in the region.   To provide some organization to the myriad hypotheses, we group the 
main theories into three--economic, political, and social—and discuss them separately below. 
Economic factors   
Murillo et al. (2009) posit a number of economic factors which could constrain the choice 
set of political candidates, making it more difficult for them to run on a left-wing platform.  First, 
large budget deficits or high debt servicing costs may make it difficult to increase the type of 
social spending that is typically favored by parties on the left.  For instance, the debt crisis of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  We agree with Stokes (2009, p. 9), who argues that presidential elections are the most relevant when studying the 
rise of the left in Latin America.  She notes that presidents are likely to have an important effect on policymaking, 
and that if voters are responding to past economic or political events, or are signaling what kind of policy they 
would like in the future, then they are most likely to do so in presidential elections.  Empirically, she goes on to note 
that “the distribution of votes” is similar in presidential and legislative elections. 
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1980s tied the hands of Latin American chief executives and may have forced them to be fiscally 
conservative.   Second, a country may be constrained by debt conditionality if they have an 
ongoing structural adjustment agreement with the IMF. A previous administration may have 
promised to rein in social spending or to keep the deficit low in return for IMF loans.   
Third, natural resource abundance might affect political ideology because resource 
exports are associated with greater economic activity and government revenue.  Commodity 
price booms significantly lessen the economic constraints on presidential candidates.  Ocampo 
(2007) argues that Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela benefited the 
most from the recent positive terms of trade shock. All of these countries have had left-wing 
chief executives in recent years.  Murillo et al. (2009, p. 13) would argue that this is no accident.  
They cite Fishlow (2006) in arguing that the commodity boom allowed governments to once 
again increase social spending and “throw off the shackles of the Washington Consensus.” 
Kaufman (2010, p. 26) notes that the current rise in commodity prices has “substantially eased 
the constraints associated with dependence on volatile flows of external capital and offered new 
opportunities to pursue populist policies.”4 This effect would be especially pronounced if 
government revenue depends heavily on the state ownership of natural resources like oil and 
natural gas (Panizza 2007, Tsafos 2007).  
Fourth, the effect of openness to trade on the ideology of the chief executive is unclear. If 
trade is perceived as being beneficial, then there will be more overall support for the candidate 
that favors trade openness (Baker 2009, Stokes 2009). On the other hand, Cameron (1978, p.71) 
argues that trade openness means that domestic policies have less effect (for example 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  He does note, however, that not all left-wing chief executives responded in the same way.  Some countries, like 
Venezuela, ramped up government spending by 50%.  Others, such as Chile and Uruguay, actually decreased 
government spending as a percentage of GDP.  In addition, the commodity boom sometimes did not take place until 
after the election, which means that, “these opportunities cannot explain why left governments were voted into 
office in the first place.” (p. 26) 
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stabilization policy). Since people dislike this, they will push for government policies to 
compensate for the volatility/insecurity that comes from openness. Greater trade openness may 
also spur people to demand government policies that promote and subsidize domestic companies 
(Katzenstein 1985).  Because a presidential candidate from the left is more likely to implement 
these types of policies, openness to trade might increase the probability that a president from the 
left gets elected.  Further, Rodrik (1999) argues that openness might bring economic insecurity, 
which would lead to greater demand for social protection.  
Lastly, macroeconomic indicators like past inflation and economic growth may also 
determine voter preference.  Lora and Olivera (2005) argue that voters may punish incumbent 
presidents if they served during a period of high inflation, while Stokes (2001) makes a similar 
argument about poor economic growth.  Murillo et al. (2009) cite Panizza (2005) in arguing that 
the rise of the left in Latin America may be partly due to the fact that conservative governments 
were in power at a time of economic distress.  That is, voters may not be against conservative 
policies per se, but may instead be reacting to poor economic conditions of the 1980s and 1990s. 
Biglaiser and Brown (2005) show that left leaning chief executives tended to oppose the types of 
structural reforms that were common in those decades, which means that voters who are 
suffering from reform fatigue may be ready for a change.  
The empirical relationship between these economic factors and the rise of the left in Latin 
America are mixed.  Murillo et al. (2009) find that budget deficits are not significantly related to 
the number of votes garnered by left-wing presidential candidates.  Unlike they expected,  they 
show that higher debt service actually increases the chance that citizens will vote for left-wing 
politicians, while IMF loans and commodity price increases are negatively and significantly 
related to a president’s ability to govern from the left.  Conservative incumbents are harmed 
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electorally by high inflation, but interestingly, not by low growth. Debs and Helmke (2010) find 
similar results, although the coefficient on the interaction term between inflation and 
conservative incumbent is not statistically significant in their estimation.5  
 
Political factors 
There are three main political factors that could explain the recent popularity of the left in 
Latin America.  First, as the region has gained more experience with democracy, radical left 
parties that used to be banned from the political arena have now become an institutionalized 
feature of the political system.  As leftist leaders became less enamored with the Soviet example 
and as the threat of communism decreased, there was less worry among conservatives and voters 
about the type of policies that leftist chief executives would enact.6 As Debs and Helmke (2009, 
p. 18) note, citizens may be more willing to vote for the left than they were before, when they 
“feared that electing the left was tantamount to triggering a military coup.” 
 Second, the fact that political parties are often weak in the region creates electoral 
volatility, meaning there may be considerable party turnover at the presidential level.7  Roberts 
and Wibbels (1999, p. 575) argue that, “political identities and organizational loyalties are 
recomposed from one election to the next.”8  As Murillo et al. (2009) and Roberts (2007) note, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  	  There is also a simpler model of retrospective voting whereby countries that had conservative presidents in the 
1990s will tend to vote instead for the opposition in the 2000s.  In this scenario, voters are not necessarily in favor of 
the left but rather wanting a change in power from the party of the incumbent (see, for example, Panizza (2005), 
Cleary (2006), Levitsky and Roberts (2008), and Murillo et al. (2009)).  Debs and Helmke (2010), however, find no 
evidence to support this. 
6	  In addition, the region has become increasingly globalized in the post-WWII period and international capital flows 
are a strong constraint on the behavior of chief executives.  Cleary (2006) argues that conservative sectors of society 
are much less fearful of the possibility of a left-wing chief executive because of these constraints.	  
7	  Murillo et al. (2009) cite Mainwaring and Scully’s (1995) definition of low electoral volatility as “stability in inter-
party competition.” 
8	  As cited in Murillo et al. (2009). 
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the lack of a strong party system provides candidates with an incentive to “espouse a more 
radical, leftist agenda of socioeconomic and political change.”9   
 Third, it is possible that the increased popularity of the left is driven in part by increased 
voter mobilization.  Cleary (2006) argues that the rise of the left has occurred in countries with a 
history of party systems that utilize mass mobilization of the electorate.  Examples of this include 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Nicaragua, Peru, and Venezuela.10 Even if the traditional 
parties of the left had been excluded from power during military rule, these parties’ tradition of 
mobilizing the poor could have helped them to create bases of power in recent years.  
Empirically, neither Murillo et al. (2009) or Debs and Helmke (2010) find statistical 
support for a significant relationship between age of democracy (or the end of the cold war) and 
left-party success in the polls.11 Murillo et al. (2009) test whether greater electoral volatility is 
related to large changes in presidential ideology and find that the coefficient is actually negative, 
which means that more volatility is associated with less left-wing chief executives. Debs and 
Helmke (2010) test the mass mobilization hypothesis and find that it is significant in only one 
regression.  They are skeptical of the causal interpretation of the result and end up dropping the 
mass mobilization variable in favor of a regression with fixed effects. 
 
Social factors  
There are two main social factors that could be relevant in the rise of the left: ethnic 
diversity and high levels of inequality.  Ethno-linguistic diversity is very high in countries such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Murillo et al. (2009, p. 111). 
10	  Debs and Helmke (2010) point out that Cleary is building on work by Roberts (2002) that categorizes party 
systems in Latin America as being either elite-mobilizing or mass-mobilizing (i.e. labor-mobilizing).   
11	  As Debs and Helmke (2010, p. 231) point out, though, this result may come about because the countries with the 
most experience with democracy also tend to have parties that govern closer to the center, “two of the oldest 
democracies, Costa Rica and Colombia, did not elect a pure left government throughout the period.” 
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as Mexico, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Guatemala, where indigenous groups make up a large part of 
the population.  These are also groups that have traditionally been excluded from national 
policymaking.  Ross (2010, p. 22) notes that, “in the mid-1990s, Latin America’s minority 
groups faced more political discrimination, and more economic discrimination, than minority 
groups in any other world region.”12 
 Leftist political movements may also have been sparked by increased mobilization of 
indigenous populations. Van Cott (2007) argues that indigenous groups have been more likely to 
make alliances with the left because the left often promotes policies to remedy past ethnic and 
racial oppression. In addition, Castañeda (1994) argues that the left associates itself with 
indigenous groups and creates a sense of belonging to a national community.  
 Inequality may also be important given that Latin America is one of the most unequal 
regions of the world (Sainz, 2006 and World Bank, 2006).  Castañeda (2006) argues that it is 
natural for the disadvantaged portions of the population in highly unequal societies to support 
politicians who favor redistributive policies.13  Krieckhaus (2006) find that democracy in highly 
unequal societies tends to result in more macroeconomic populism, a platform associated with 
the radical left.   
Kaufman (2009), however, cautions against making the common assumption that the 
poor are also pro-left.  He notes that Latinobarometro surveys find no relationship between 
income levels and redistributive preferences on an individual level.14   In a sample of presidential 
and legislative elections in seventeen Latin American nations from 1985 to 2002, Lora and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Ross credits Gurr (2000) for this argument, but notes that, “this has begun to change.”  See Madrid (2008), Van 
Cott (2005), and Yashar (2005) for more on the increased political involvement of indigenous groups in Latin 
America. 
13	  See also Walker, 2008, Castañeda and Navia 2007, Fishlow 2007.	  
14 He also notes that it would be hard for inequality levels to explain the variation in left-wing politics in the region.  
For example, there are the more radical left-wing presidencies of Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia as well as the 
more moderate governments of Chile, Brazil, and Uruguay. Venezuela, however, does not have a particularly high 
level of inequality.   
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Olivera (2005) also report no significant relationship between income inequality and the election 
of opposition candidates.15 
Debs and Helmke (2010) argue that the relationship between inequality and the left is 
more complex than the linear one posited by Castañeda (2006).  They construct a game-theoretic 
model that predicts an inverted u-shape relationship between inequality and the success of the 
left.  At low levels of inequality, the rich are not concerned that politicians will engage in a lot of 
redistribution.  As inequality increases, the median (poor) voter becomes increasingly likely to 
vote for a left-wing politician who promises redistribution.  At very high levels of inequality, 
rich voters offers bribes to achieve a “minimum willing coalition of voters” to prevent 
widespread redistribution. Debs and Helmke find supporting evidence that the success of left-
wing parties is maximized at intermediate levels of inequality in Latin America.   Murillo et al. 
(2008), find no significant support for the idea that inequality is either linearly or non-linearly 
related to the rise of the left in the region.  However, they use the vote share for left-wing parties 
as the dependent variable, while Debs and Helmke study the ideology of the chief executive.   
Our paper contributes to this literature in several ways.  First, we focus on disaggregated 
commodity exports rather than general measures like overall exports or the current account 
balance.  The relationship between the left and commodity prices is important because if the 
resurgence of the left is mostly due to a boom in commodity exports, then the staying power of 
these parties may be compromised.  It is well known that commodity export prices are more 
volatile on average than manufactured exports.  If governments are relying heavily on gains from 
commodity exports to ramp up social spending, then they may find themselves in trouble when 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Handlin (2007) examines the elections of left-wing chief executives in Chile and Uruguay and finds that most of 
their support was from the middle class, while Madrid (2008) shows no significant relationship between income and 
voter preference in the 2006 election of Evo Morales.	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commodity prices fall again.16 In our analysis we also explore how different types of 
commodities might have different effects on political outcomes.  
Second, while other papers have investigated the effect of indigenous movements and 
inequality on the rise of the left, we also study the role of political discrimination in these 
countries.  It may not be inequality or large indigenous groups that are fuelling the increased 
popularity in left-of-center parties, but rather people’s belief that they have been systematically 
excluded from the political sphere for many years.   
Lastly, our methodology is different from empirical analyses that study the proportion of 
the total votes that each political party received in the region.  Investigating the proportional 
voting is interesting and useful, but we believe that the ideology of who gets elected is also 
important.  Voters could be casting ballots for left-of-center parties knowing that the party does 
not have a viable chance to get elected.  We want to study elections in which an overwhelming 
portion of the electorate was in favor of electing a president from a left-wing party. Our analysis 
builds on previous work that looks at political ideology of the elected president by using the most 
updated data on political ideology from Coppedge (2010).17 
 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
We investigate the economic, political, and social factors behind presidential ideology in 
a sample of 18 Latin American countries from 1978 until 2007, a period that comprises 100 
elections.18 Our dependent variable is the political ideology of the elected president. Most of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Note that this is not true in every case.  Chilean and Brazilian politicians, for example, have moderated spending 
plans and made sure to smooth large gains in commodity price upswings.	  
17	  Murillo et al. (2009) and Debs and Helmke (2010) also investigate the factors behind which chief executives get 
elected.	  	  
18 Note that the panel is unbalanced since election years are different for different countries and the length of 
presidential terms varies across the region. 
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independent variables are calculated as the average in the previous presidential term. The 
countries in the sample include Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.  
We use an ordered probit model because our dependent variable is an ordinal variable 
that takes on different values depending on the ideology of the chief executive. For robustness, 
we also explore the estimation of an ordered logit model, where the error term is a random error 
with a logit distribution (instead of a normal distribution like in the ordered probit).  Because 
observations within countries might not be independent, we use robust standard errors that 
correct for clustered data by country.  
Our first step is to classify chief executives in the region by political ideology over our 
sample period.  We compile the names and political parties of the elected presidents during a 
specific election year using data from the Political Database of the Americas and Electionworld. 
Then, we match this information to the Coppedge’s data (1994, 2007). Coppedge classifies 
political parties in Latin America as being either left, center-left, center, center-right, and right.19 
In a few cases, Coppedge categorizes some political parties as personalist when the appeal of the 
political party is based on charisma, the party is independent of any ideology, or there is a 
heterogeneous electoral base where support to the presidential candidate comes from groups with 
different political ideologies. We use Coppedge’s (1997) dataset for the elections that take place 
before 1994 and use the newest version of the dataset provided by Coppedge for elections after 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Please refer to Coppedge (1997) for a thorough explanation of the methodology used to classify political parties in 
Latin America. Coppedge (2007) provides a more recent analysis of changes of political parties in Latin America, 
where his updated version (as of August of 2010) of the data has been checked for accuracy by experts in the field. 
One characteristic of this dataset is that political parties can be classified in the ideological spectrum differently over 
time. This is important because there is evidence that political parties evolve in the region.  
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1994. We use Huber’s et al. (2008) dataset for six countries (Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama) that are missing in Coppedge’s dataset. 
Our dependent variable is ordinal and can take on five different values depending on the 
ideology of the chief executive. A value of one is assigned to presidents that are associated with 
a political party from the left, while a value of five is assigned to presidents from right-wing 
parties (two for center-left, three for center, and four for center-right). Our sample includes 100 
observations, and there are only three observations where Coppedge has identified the 
presidential political party as personalist.20  We assign a value of three to these observations 
since this implies ideological neutrality.21 Table 1 provides the summary statistics of all variables 
used in the estimation and Table 2 provides a detailed description of the variables and their 
sources. 
We consider several different economic, political, and social factors that could determine 
what party gets elected at the presidential level.  We lag the independent variables, using average 
values in a previous presidential term to explain the ideology of the current chief executive.  The 
economic factors we include are: the inflation rate, real per-capita GDP growth, trade openness, 
the debt service as a share of GDP, and commodity exports.22  As discussed above, inflation and 
GDP growth are often thought to be key economic determinants of voting. Given the inflationary 
records of past populist chief executives in the region, we expect that high inflation in the 
previous period will decrease the likelihood that voters will elect a left-of-center president.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Coppedge identifies the following elections as personalist: Ecuador in 1996 and 2002, and Venezuela in 1993.  
21	  Note that we only include those observations in which the executive ideology is classified as personalist if we 
need them for our estimation (observation is in the middle of the sample period for a specific country).	  
22	  We considered including unemployment figures as a potential explanatory variable but the lack of data meant that 
its inclusion would have halved our sample. 	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We measure commodity exports with three different variables: average lagged exports 
per worker of agricultural, mineral, and oil commodities.23 As discussed above, Latin America is 
a resource abundant region and commodity booms positively affected export prices of raw 
materials in the region.  If these commodities are state-owned, then the increased export revenues 
will directly affect government coffers.  If they are privately held, tax revenues should rise as 
firms become more profitable.   This leaves the question of why increased commodity revenues 
would help the left instead of helping politicians from all ideological backgrounds.  We believe 
that there are two reasons for this.   
First, Latin America underwent a very painful adjustment during the 1980s, painful 
enough in fact for the period to be dubbed the “lost decade” for the region.  Whatever their 
ideological background, politicians were forced by high debt servicing to follow very 
conservative policies that entailed the slashing of government social spending and increased 
taxes.  Commodity windfalls might be especially beneficial for politicians from the left, who can 
represent a break from the painful past.  Voters may reject conservative politicians who 
campaigned on business-as-usual platforms, especially if government coffers were newly flush.  
Second, left wing politicians can credibly promise more rents from these commodities than right-
wing politicians.  They can (and do) promise to nationalize companies (Chavez), demand higher 
royalty rights (Morales) by renegotiating with foreign companies, or raise export taxes (the 
Kirchners).24 Minerals and oil are often directly controlled by the state, which allows the 
government to redistribute resource rents. Even when the commodity is not in state hands, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Please see Blanco and Grier (2010) for an explanation of how the different resource intensive commodities are 
classified in different categories. 
24	  In Venezuela, at least, there has been a long-standing and widespread belief by citizens that their country is 
fundamentally rich because of oil reserves and the reason most of the population has stayed so poor is that the 
income from oil is badly distributed. Given this, it is clear why a populist politician from the left who promises to 
redistribute oil money would be so popular.  
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however, the government certainly taxes these sectors and we might again expect left-wing 
candidates to be more successful during commodity booms. 
To investigate which political factors are important to chief executive ideology, we 
include two measures of political instability (the number of revolutions and government crises), 
the strength of democratic institutions, and political discrimination. A revolution is defined as 
“any illegal or forced change in the top governmental elite, any attempt at such a change, or any 
successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion whose aim is independence from the central 
government.” 26  Revolutionary activity may be a strong signal that the voters wish to move away 
from previous policies.   In our sample, most serious revolutionary activity has been from the 
left.  Examples include the FARC in Colombia throughout the period, the FMNL in El Salvador 
in the 1980s, the Zapatistas in Mexico starting in 1994, and the war between the Contras and the 
Sandinistas in Nicaragua in the 1980s. If the activity represents widespread anger from voters 
who feel excluded from the electoral system, then it is possible that such activity will presage a 
change in the ruling party.  If the revolutionary activity alienates mainstream voters with their 
extremism, however, then citizens may feel safer voting for a more conservative party. 
Government crisis is defined as “any rapidly developing situation that threatens to bring 
the downfall of the present regime - excluding situations of revolt aimed at such overthrow.” 
Many of the political crises experienced during the period of analysis were triggered by negative 
economic conditions.  Examples include, among others, the Argentine financial crisis of 2001 
and the Bolivian hyperinflation of the early 1980s.  Thus, this indicator is likely to at least 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 We focus on the revolutions and crises variables as measures of political instability since they are indicators of 
strong distress in the political system, while the indicators such as strikes and demonstrations might not be as strong 
of a symptom. Coups are also threatening to the political system like revolutions, but in our sample, there are only 6 
observations in which there was a coup. For those 6 observations, there was a revolution as well in 5 of the cases. 
We prefer revolutions instead of coups because in almost half of our sample (41 observations) there was at least one 
revolution.  
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partially account for critical economic conditions that would negatively impact government 
stability.  Risk-averse voters might lean more towards conservative candidates after a 
government crisis if they are seeking stability, unless they feel that the conservative party is to 
blame for bringing about the situation.  We will first investigate the effect that revolutions and 
government crises have on the ideology of the elected chief executive, and later interact these 
variables with a dummy equal to one if the previous president was from a right-wing party.27 
To measure the strength of democratic institutions, we use the average of the polity score 
in the previous presidential term. The polity score ranges from -10 to 10, where higher values 
represent stronger democracies.  For political discrimination, we include a measure of the 
average of the political discrimination index. This index varies between zero and four, where 
higher values represent higher political discrimination.  In cases like the election of Evo Morales 
in Bolivia, the success of the left was largely due to its ability to tap into widespread discontent 
with elite politics.  Much of the indigenous community had been consistently marginalized in the 
political arena and thus was more likely to vote for a candidate that offered a break from the 
past.28  
We also examine whether social factors such as ethno-linguistic diversity and inequality 
are important to presidential ideology.  We measure ethno-linguistic diversity with the ethno-
linguistic fractionalization index for each country in 1960. This index represents the probability 
that two randomly selected individuals from the population belong to different ethno-linguistic 
groups. Thus, higher values of this index represent higher ethnic diversity. Countries that have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 The correlation coefficient between revolutions and government crises in our sample is only .17, so it is clear that 
they are measuring different phenomena. 
28 The measure of political discrimination is time-variant for 8 countries in the sample.  We should note that we also 
experimented with including a dummy variable that is equal to one for countries with party systems that rely on 
mass mobilization.  We found that the variable is consistently insignificant and do not report its results for reasons 
of space. 
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the highest levels of diversity also have the largest indigenous populations.  As we discussed 
above, if these groups have felt marginalized either economically or politically, it may be easy 
for left wing candidates to mobilize their support.  
Lastly, we also include a measure of inequality to test whether highly unequal countries 
have been more likely to elect left wing politicians.  Specifically, we use an indicator of resource 
inequality, the area of family farms as a percentage of the total area of agricultural holdings. This 
indicator is associated with income inequality and is available for each decade of the same.  We 
lag the variable, using the available share of family farms before the election year. 
 
RESULTS 
Baseline Estimations 
 Column 1 of Table 3 presents the results of estimating our baseline model, where we 
include all of the variables discussed above.  We find mixed evidence that macroeconomic 
factors are important determinants of presidential ideology. Both lagged per-capita GDP growth 
and the debt service variable are insignificant.29 Like Stokes (2009), though, we show that trade 
openness is positive and significant at the 5 percent level.30 As trade (as a percentage of GDP) 
increased in the previous period, so does the probability that the current president’s ideology will 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  We tried a measure of government consumption expenditures (as a % of GDP) instead of debt servicing and found 
that it was also insignificant.  Note that Stokes (2009) and Murillo et al. (2008) also find that the level and growth 
rate of per-capita GDP were not significant predictors of the left’s electoral success in Latin America. We 
experimented with several other measures of economic health and continued to find that they were consistently 
insignificant.  For instance, we created dummy variables for high, medium, and low rates of per-capita GDP growth, 
were the high (low) dummy was equal to 1 when growth was one standard deviation above (below) the sample 
mean.  We also tried several different measures of poverty incidence, including the percentage of the population 
living below $2/day and $1.25/day.   
30	  We should note that Stokes (2009) defines the dependent variable differently than us.  She studies the vote share 
of the left relative to the vote share of the right in Latin American presidential elections.   
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be more conservative.  This could imply that voters find it costlier to elect left-wing candidates 
now that the economy is a bigger player in international markets.31  
Inflation is significant at the ten percent level, but with the opposite sign as the 
coefficient on trade openness. A higher inflation rate in the previous presidential terms is 
correlated with an increased probability that the next president will be from a left-wing party.  
This result is somewhat counterintuitive because we would expect voters to shy away from 
electing a left-of-center chief executive if the country is already suffering inflationary troubles.32 
Latin America has a history of high inflation, many periods of which were associated with left-
wing regimes and populist policies.33  It is possible that it is not the inflation rate per se that 
matters, but whether the inflation occurred under a liberal or conservative regime.  Below we 
experiment with interacting the macroeconomic variables with a dummy variable representing 
conservative incumbent presidents.  This allows us to test if the effect of inflation on presidential 
ideology differs depending on the ideology of the previous chief executive.  
 We find significant support for the argument that natural resources exports are positively 
related to the probability of having a left-wing president.  As Column 1 of Table 3 demonstrates, 
agricultural and oil exports are negative and significant at the one percent level, while minerals 
are negative and significant at the five percent level.  These results support the argument that an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  We also experimented with including a variable measuring a country’s net barter terms of trade, which is defined 
as “the percentage ratio of the export unit value indexes to the import unit value indexes, measured relative to the 
base year 2000” (WDI, 2011).  We would expect that as the terms of trade improves, individuals are more likely to 
vote for conservative presidential candidates that support trade openness.  We find evidence of that as the variable is 
positive but only weakly significant at the .10 level. 
32	  We constructed three dummy variables representing high, medium and low levels of inflation.  The high (low) 
inflation dummy is equal to one if average inflation is in the triple (single) digits.  The medium dummy is equal to 1 
for all other levels of inflation.  We found no significant relationship between the high and medium dummies and 
the probability that a left-wing president takes office. 
33	  To test whether inflation variability matters, we replaced our inflation variable with the standard deviation of 
inflation and found that it is negative and significant.  The coefficients of the other variables kept their original sign 
and significance levels.  	  
	   18 
increase in natural resource exports are associated with an increased probability of left-wing 
success in presidential elections.34    
Of the different political variables that we control for, revolutions, government crises and 
political discrimination are all significantly related to the ideology of the chief executive at the 
five percent level.  The coefficient on revolutions is positive, which indicates that countries that 
experienced political revolutions in the previous electoral period were actually more likely to 
have a conservative president in the current period.  A lot of the revolutionary activity in the 
region has been from the left-wing and it is possible that this extremism has ended up hurting the 
left’s success at the polls.  
Unlike we expected, the coefficient for government crises is negative and significant, 
indicating that this type of political instability decreases the probability of a conservative 
government being elected.35 We had hypothesized that this type of uncertainty might drive voters 
to prefer more conservative candidates, but it instead increases the possibility that left-wing 
presidents take office.  It is quite possible that the effect of this variable depends on whether the 
previous president was from the right or left.  In the next section, we interact this variable with a 
dummy variable equal to one if the previous president was conservative. 
Political discrimination is negative and significant at the five percent level, indicating that 
increased political discrimination is significantly related to the probability of a left-wing chief 
executive. Our measure of the strength of democracy, on the other hand, is insignificantly related 
to the political ideology of the president.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  We also tried including natural resource rents instead of resource commodities (data from WDI).  We find similar 
results in that mineral and gas rents are negative and statistically significant at the five and one percent level.  
However, unlike what we found with oil exports, the results show that the variable measuring oil rents is not 
significantly related to the dependent variable.  
35 As discussed above, our crisis variable measures political crises.  To account for periods of crises, we also 
experimented with a dummy that accounted for periods of negative growth and levels of inflation above 50 percent. 
We found that when these dummies are included separately in the model they are both insignificant. 
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We do not find evidence that social conditions are related to the ideology of the chief 
executive.  The coefficients on inequality (measured as the percentage of farm acreage held as 
family farms) and ethnic fractionalization are insignificant at any conventional level.36 
In column 2 of Table 3, we re-estimate our model excluding all of the independent 
variables that were insignificant in column 1.37  As shown in Column 2, excluding the 
insignificant independent variables has very little effect on the sign and significance of the 
remaining variables. We use a scalar measure of fit, the Bayesian information criterion (BIC), to 
determine whether the restricted model is preferred over the initial model. The BIC for the 
restricted model is smaller than for the initial model and the difference is significant, thus 
providing support for using the pared-down model.38  In this estimation, which is shown in 
column 2 of Table 3, the significance of inflation increases from ten to five percent. The 
significance of mineral exports and crises increase from five to one percent, and the size of the 
coefficients for most variables are of similar magnitude to those shown in column 1 of Table 3. 
Column 3 of Table 3 shows the estimates from the pared-down model using an ordered 
logit estimator. As mentioned before, the ordered probit assumes a normal distribution of the 
error term, while the ordered logit assumes a logistic distribution. By exploring the ordered 
logistic model we are taking into consideration the possibility that the error term takes a different 
distribution.  As expected, the coefficients of the ordered logit model, shown in column 3 of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 We also used Solt’s (2009) GINI coefficients, which are based on gross and net income and vary over time., but 
they were consistently insignificant in our estimations. Time-invariant averages of GINI coefficients, whether 
measured with land or income data, produced similarly insignificant results. We also explore possible nonlinear 
effects of inequality using the resource inequality variable in our ordered probit model. We find that the probability 
of a president from the left being elected is maximized at medium levels of inequality, a result similar to that found 
by Debs and Helmke (2010). The nonlinear effect of inequality is not robust to using alternative indicators of 
inequality. 
37	  When using MLE in small samples, one must be cautious about the consistency and efficiency of the results. 
Indeed, Long (1997) suggests having at least 10 observations per parameter when using MLE.  	  
38 The BIC for the restricted and initial model are 324.47 and 340.44, respectively. The difference is equal to 15.97, 
providing strong evidence that the restricted model is preferred. 
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Table 3, are larger than those of the ordered probit and the sign and significance of most of the 
coefficients stays the same. While the significance of crises decreases from the one percent level 
to the five percent level, the significance of trade openness and revolutions falls from the five 
percent level to the ten percent level.   
 
Robustness Tests 
For robustness purposes, we explore in this section whether our previous results are 
robust to several modifications.  First, we include decade dummy variables to test for any time-
varying factor that we have failed to capture.  The results, presented in Column 4 of Table 3, are 
very similar to those reported in column 2 of Table 3.  All the variables in the baseline model 
continue to be significant at the one and five percent level, and the dummy for the 2000s decade 
is negative but only marginally significant at the 10 percent level. The reason why we observe 
this marginal effect for the 2000s decade dummy might be related to the fact that 
macroeconomic stability has become a very valuable public good for voters, which has forced 
leftist presidents to implement policies that are more appealing to the center-left than to the left. 
An example of a president from the left who has adjusted his agenda for the sake of 
macroeconomic stability is Lula in Brazil. By taking a less radical approach, leftist candidates 
have increased their probability of being elected in the last decade. 
Second, we explore using a different categorization of chief executive ideology.  Instead 
of a five-category dependent variable, we collapse the different groups into three categories:  
left-of center, center, and right-of-center. Five categories in the dependent variable may be 
asking a lot of the data and reducing the number of categories helps alleviate this problem. 
Lumping categories together also help dealing with the difficulty to make clear distinctions 
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among categories that are closely related such as left and left of center categories. Some could 
argue that distinguishing between these two, or between right and center-right, could be 
problematic. Column 5 of Table 3 presents the results of this estimation. In general, most of our 
results are very similar to those of the pared down model in column 2, Table 3.  Trade openness 
and revolutions, which previously were significant at the five percent level, are now significant 
at the ten percent level.  All the other indicators are significant at the one and five percent level. 
Third, we test whether there is a pendulum effect occurring in presidential elections in the 
region by including a dummy variable called Right that is equal to one if the previous president 
was from a conservative party and zero otherwise.39  This allows us to test if voters are more 
likely to vote for a left-of-center presidential candidate when the incumbent president was from a 
conservative party.  We also interact Right with the macroeconomic variables. It is possible that 
the effect of macroeconomic shifts in the previous presidential term will have a differential effect 
depending on whether the incumbent chief executive was from a conservative party. The results, 
shown in Column 1 of Table 4, indicate that trade openness, commodity exports (agricultural, 
mineral, and oil), revolutions, crises, and political discrimination are still statistically significant 
and have the same sign as previous estimations.  
The coefficient on Right is positive and significant at the five percent level, meaning that 
countries that had right wing presidents in the last presidential term are more likely to have right 
wing presidents in the current term as well. However, the interaction between Right and trade 
openness is negative and significant at the five percent level, and the size of the coefficient 
erases the previous effect of openness on presidential ideology.  Like Stokes (2009), we show 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 All of our right-hand side variables are lagged one presidential term. In the case of the right dummy, it is also 
lagged in that it is equal to 1 when there was a right president in the previous presidential term.  Including this new 
variable causes the number of observations to fall from 100 to 82 because the data to construct this dummy is the 
same as the data we use to construct the dependent variable.  
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that when the previous president was from a conservative party, the effect of lagged trade 
openness on the ideology of the current president no longer matters.40  We also find that the 
interaction term between Right and inflation is negative and statistically significant at the five 
percent level. This result indicates that higher levels of inflation in a previous presidential term 
matters when the incumbent was conservative.  If the previous president was conservative and 
failed to maintain price stability, voters are more likely to elect a left-wing president in the 
current term. 
Fourth, we also interact the Right dummy with the revolution and government crisis 
variables.  The coefficient on revolutions and revolutions*Right are both insignificant, indicating 
that the effect of this type of political instability on the ideology of the current chief executive 
does not depend on the ideology of the previous one.  Revolutions increase the probability of a 
left-wing president being elected, whether or not there was a conservative party in office in the 
previous period.  The effect of government crises on our dependent variable, however, does 
depend on the ideology of the previous officeholder.  The coefficient on crises*Right is negative 
and significant, indicating that conservative parties are punished when there was a crisis during 
their presidential term.   
Fifth, we explore whether previous economic reform significantly affects the probability 
of a left-wing president being elected.  Latin American countries adopted serious reform after the 
debt crisis and reduced state intervention in the economy.  Among other policies, trade was 
opened to foreign competition, state enterprises were privatized, and governments balanced their 
budgets.  These types of reforms are typically known as the Washington Consensus.  As Easterly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  Stokes (2009), using a different dependent variable than us, finds that low inflation under previous conservative 
regimes is positively predicts the left’s vote share relative to the right.  We, however, do not find any evidence that 
the ideology of the previous president can significantly explain the left’s electoral outcomes in the subsequent 
election. 
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et al. (1997) point out, by the end of the 1990s, there was widespread disappointment about the 
results that these reforms had yielded.   
It is quite possible that the unfulfilled promises of these reforms could explain the rise of 
the left in the region in the 2000s.  To measure how deep these reforms really were, we use an 
index constructed by Lora (2001) that measures trade and financial liberalization, tax and labor 
reforms, and privatization. Column 3 of Table 4 presents the results of including this index in our 
baseline model.  The coefficient on the reform variable is negative and marginally significant at 
the .10 level, indicating that previous reform efforts are associated with more left-wing 
presidents in the current period.41 
Finally, we evaluate the stability of our coefficients and test whether our findings are 
driven by any outlier. We employ a Jackknife approach and estimate our baseline model 
excluding one country at the time. Table 5 shows the distribution of the jackknife coefficients. 
We find that the significance of oil exports per worker goes away once we exclude Venezuela 
from the sample. This is interesting since it shows that the importance of oil exports on political 
ideology seem to matter only for a large oil exporter like Venezuela.  
 
Quantitative Effects 
We calculate the quantitative effect of the variables that have a robust effect on 
presidential ideology. Using the estimates of our baseline model shown in Column 2 of Table 3, 
we calculate the marginal effect of an independent variable on the probability that a specific 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 We were curious whether the Lora’s reform index was perhaps correlated with trade openness or even commodity 
exports.  We tested and found that the correlation between it and these other indicators is never higher than 0.22.  
Including the reform index in the specification while excluding the other variables yields very similar results.  The 
coefficient on the index continues to be marginally significant at the ten percent level.  
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outcome is observed. Table 6 presents the marginal effect of each independent variable on the 
probability of a given category of political ideology in the political spectrum.  
The marginal effect of inflation on the probability that a president from the left (y=1) is 
elected is equal to 0.00002, while the probability that a president from the right (y=5) is elected 
decreases by 0.00005. For the marginal effect of resource dependence on political ideology of 
the executive, we find that an increase in the exports of natural resource commodities of one unit 
(one US dollar per worker) increases the probability that the president is from a left-wing (y=1) 
party by 0.0002 for agricultural exports and by 0.0001 for mineral and oil exports.  On the other 
hand, we observe that an increase of one unit of agricultural, mineral, and oil exports reduces the 
probability that a president from the right (y=5) is elected by 0.0006, 0.0003, and 0.0002, 
respectively. In the case of revolutions, we find that an increase in revolutions by one unit 
decreases the probability that a president from the left (y=1) is elected by 0.03, but increases the 
probability that a president from the right (y=5) is elected by 0.08. Crises seems to show a larger 
effect in the opposite direction of revolutions, where an increase in crises by one unit increases 
the probability that a leftist president is elected by 0.07, but decreases the probability that a 
president from the right is elected by 0.16.   For political discrimination we find that an increase 
in the index by one unit raises (lowers) the probability that a president from the left (right) is 
elected by 0.02 (0.04).42 It is interesting that countries that are more dependent on the agricultural 
sector have more of a tendency to elect left-of-center chief executives. While higher agricultural 
exports might lead to greater government revenues, it may also be the case that some left-wing 
presidents make a concerted effort to woo rural voters (Olper, 2007, Moreno-Brid and 
Pauvanovic, 2009).     
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Here we refer to probabilities, which can be interpreted in percentage terms. For example, a 0.02 increase in 
probability can be interpreted as a 2 percent increase. 
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CONCLUSION 
We examine various economic, political, and social reasons for the increased election of 
left-of-center chief executives and find that three factors are important.  First, commodity exports 
in agriculture, mining, and oil are all positively and significantly related to the probability of a 
left-wing candidate becoming president.  This result has important implications for the staying 
power of these governments.  When commodity prices drop, they will need to seek other sources 
of revenue to maintain funding for social programs.  While it seems clear that natural resource 
abundance in the region will continue to play a key role in political outcomes, it is important to 
note that the importance of oil exports only seems to matter for Venezuela. 
Second, we find evidence that past political discrimination is an important factor behind 
the rise of the left, a finding that supports arguments that left-wing parties have been able to tap 
into widespread and deep discontent over voters’ feelings of political marginalization. We show 
that trade openness also matters for presidential ideology, but only if the previous president was 
not a conservative.  More open countries are less likely to elect a left-wing chief executive, 
unless the previous president was from a conservative party, in which case openness has no 
effect on the ideology of the current chief executive.  
We also find that government crises matter for the political ideology of the chief 
executive, but only when a crisis occurs during the tenure of a conservative president.  That is, 
conservative presidents are punished electorally when there was a crisis on their watch, while 
left-wing presidents are not. This result indicates that an unstable political environment is likely 
to provide an environment where individuals are more likely to vote for the left candidate. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics  
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs 
Political Ideology (1-5) 3.1100 1.2135 1.0000 5.0000 100 
Political Ideology (1-3) 1.0300 0.9040 0.0000 2.0000 100 
GDP growth 2.9154 2.6571 -6.7483 8.8779 100 
Trade openness 55.4412 29.0464 15.2069 179.0501 100 
Inflation 158.4711 520.9700 -6.7719 3221.9300 100 
Debt service (GDP share) 6.3644 2.5861 1.5888 13.6377 100 
Reform 0.4629 0.1106 0.2723 0.6945 96 
Agricultural exports 199.5386 169.0007 10.4396 797.1879 100 
Mineral exports 36.9975 85.3414 0.0048 551.2698 100 
Oil exports 134.5553 331.6333 0.0068 1723.7670 100 
Revolutions 0.2760 0.4899 0.0000 2.5000 100 
Crises 0.2315 0.3826 0.0000 2.2500 100 
Democracy 6.1187 4.1433 -7.0000 10.0000 100 
Political discrimination 2.5073 1.0397 0.0000 4.0000 100 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.4405 0.1851 0.1689 0.7396 100 
Resource inequality 26.5600 9.6686 5.0000 54.0000 100 
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Table 2. Variables Description and Sources  
Variable Description and Source 
Political 
ideology indices 
Index of political ideology of chief executive, ranges from 1 to 5 (1=left, 
2=center-left, 3=center, 4=center-right, 5=right). We also construct an 
index with 3 categories (1=left and center-left, 2=center, 3=right and 
center-right). Source: Authors’ construction using data from Political 
Database of the Americas (2009), Electionworld (2009), Coppedge 
(2007), and Huber et al. (2008). 
Real GDP 
growth (High 
and Med) 
Average growth rate of real GDP. The high (low) dummy is equal to one 
when growth is at least one standard deviation above (below) the sample 
average. Source: WDI (2010). 
Trade openness Average of trade (exports plus imports) as a share of GDP. Source: WDI 
(2010). 
Inflation 
(Std.dev) 
Average (and standard deviation) of the inflation rate using the GDP 
deflator. Source: WDI (2010). 
Debt service  Average total debt service on external debt (current US dollars) as a share 
of GDP. Source: Authors’ construction using WDI (2010). 
Reform Average of reform index, which is available between 1985 and 1999. We 
use the earliest available average for observations before 1985, and the 
latest available average for observations after 1999. Index not available 
for Panama. Source: Lora (2001). 
Commodity 
exports 
Average exports of agricultural, mineral and oil commodities per worker. 
Source: UNCOMTRADE (2010) 
Revolutions and 
Crises 
Average number of revolutions, defined as “any illegal or forced change 
in the top governmental elite, any attempt at such a change, or any 
successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion whose aim is independence 
from the central government.” Average number of government crises, 
defined as “any rapidly developing situation that threatens to bring the 
downfall of the present regime - excluding situations of revolt aimed at 
such overthrow.” Source: CNTS (2011). 
Democracy 
score 
Average of the Polity2 score. Source: Marshall and Jaggers (2010). 
Political 
discrimination 
Average of the index of political discrimination, time variant for some 
countries, but invariant for others. Source: MAR (2010) 
Inequality 
(resource) 
The area of family farms as a percentage of the total area of holdings (10-
year frequency). Use the available value before the presidential term. 
Source: Vanhanen (2003) 
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Ethnic 
fractionalization 
Time-invariant index. Source: Alesina et al. (2003) 
Time dummies Time dummy constructed for the decade in which the election takes place. 
Right dummy Equal to 1 if the previous president was from the right (center-right and 
right), 0 otherwise. Source: Authors’ construction using the political 
ideology indices.  
All variables are estimated as the average of their value in the presidential term previous to the 
election year, unless stated otherwise. Averages are calculated with available observations.  
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Table 3. Determinants of Political Ideology of the Executive in Latin America  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
GDP growth 0.0053     
 (0.0449)     
Trade openness 0.0064** 0.0062** 0.0096* 0.0078** 0.0048* 
 (0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0055) (0.0039) (0.0029) 
Inflation -0.0002* -0.0003** -0.0005*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
Debt service -0.0287     
 (0.0656)     
Agric. exports -0.0038*** -0.0032*** -0.0059*** -0.0032*** -0.0044*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Mineral exports -0.0016** -0.0017*** -0.0027*** -0.0014** -0.0019*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0006) (0.0007) 
Oil exports -0.0012*** -0.0012*** -0.0023*** -0.0012*** -0.0010*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Revolutions 0.4357** 0.4230** 0.6252* 0.6547*** 0.6405* 
 (0.1934) (0.1858) (0.3217) (0.1781) (0.3595) 
Crises -0.7605** -0.8879*** -1.4645** -0.8750** -1.2120*** 
 (0.3232) (0.3205) (0.6243) (0.4040) (0.4055) 
Democracy 0.0015     
 (0.0251)     
Pol. discrimination -0.2744** -0.2729** -0.4844** -0.3408** -0.3487*** 
 (0.1335) (0.1231) (0.2128) (0.1396) (0.1084) 
Ethnic diversity -1.0360     
 (1.0928)     
Inequality 0.0057     
 (0.0106)     
1980s dummy    -0.1542  
    (0.5378)  
1990s dummy    0.0496  
    (0.5305)  
2000s dummy    -0.9551*  
    (0.5469)  
Log-Likelihood -131.1 -132.3 -132.0 -126.3 -87.1 
Chi Square 264.10 60.90 60.36 131.10 77.00 
Pseudo R2 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.16 0.168 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All estimations include 100 
observations. Columns 1, 2, and 4 show ordered probit estimates, and Column 3 shows ordered logit. 
Columns 1, 2, 3 and 4 use the executive ideology index with values 1-5, and Column 5 uses values 1-3. 
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Table 4. Determinants of Political Ideology of the Executive in Latin America 
 
	   (1) (2) (3) 
Trade openness 0.0180** 0.0078** 0.0112 
 (0.0081) (0.0036) (0.0069) 
Inflation -0.00001 -0.0002 -0.0002 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Agricultural exports -0.0026*** -0.0028*** -0.0031*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Mineral exports -0.0020*** -0.0018** -0.0011 
 (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008) 
Oil exports -0.0015*** -0.0016*** -0.0015*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
Revolutions 0.4071*** 0.5600 0.5595*** 
 (0.1476) (0.3976) (0.1927) 
Crises -0.7341** -0.4814 -0.6818** 
 (0.3530) (0.3357) (0.3060) 
Pol. discrimination -0.2682** -0.3040*** -0.3063** 
 (0.1339) (0.1156) (0.1379) 
Right dummy 1.4948** 0.3908  
 (0.7131) (0.4576)  
Right*trade  -0.0228**   
 (0.0101)   
Right*inflation -0.0006**   
 (0.0002)   
Right*revolution   -0.0357  
  (0.4355)  
Right*crises  -1.3577**  
  (0.6846)  
Reform   -2.5987* 
   (1.4356) 
Observations 82 82 96 
Log-Likelihood -102.7 -104.20 -124.6 
Chi Square 149.40 157.20 132.10 
Pseudo R2 0.17 0.16 0.14 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All columns 
show ordered probit estimates and use the executive ideology index with values 1-5. 
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Table 5. Jackknife Coefficient Distributions 
          
 
Jackknife of Table 3, Column 2     
 
  Mean Std. Dev Min Max Sig 
Trade openness 0.0063 0.0012 0.0037 0.0085 16 
Inflation -0.0003 0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0002 17 
Agricultural exports -0.0032 0.0002 -0.0037 -0.0027 18 
Mineral exports -0.0018 0.0009 -0.0053 -0.0014 18 
Oil exports -0.0012 0.0003 -0.0015 -0.0002 17 
Revolutions 0.4247 0.0647 0.3425 0.5978 18 
Crises -0.8964 0.1204 -1.3037 -0.7368 18 
Political discrimination -0.2770 0.0425 -0.3522 -0.1668 18 
      
Last column indicates the number of cases in which the coefficient is significant at least 
at the 10 percent level (out of 18 cases). 
 
Table 6. Marginal Effect of Independent Variables (using model in Table 3, Column 2) 
	   	   	   	   	   	  
 
dy/dx      
 Pr(y=1) Pr(y=2) Pr(y=3) Pr(y=4) Pr(y=5) 
Trade openness -0.0005 -0.0019 -0.00004 0.0013 0.0011 
Inflation 0.00002 0.0001 0.000002 -0.0001 -0.00005 
Agricultural exports 0.0002 0.0010 0.00002 -0.0007 -0.0006 
Mineral exports 0.0001 0.0005 0.00001 -0.0003 -0.0003 
Oil exports 0.0001 0.0004 0.00001 -0.0003 -0.0002 
Revolutions -0.0314 -0.1287 -0.0027 0.0877 0.0750 
Crises 0.0659 0.2701 0.0056 -0.1842 -0.1575 
Political discrimination 0.0203 0.0830 0.0017 -0.0566 -0.0484 
 
 
 
 
 
